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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
James Black contends the district court's sentencing decision failed on the third prong of
the test for abuse of discretion for several reasons, the most notably being it downplayed (and so,
did not giving proper effect to) the actual mitigating impact of his intellectual disability. He
explained this was inconsistent with the applicable legal standards set forth in the Eighth
Amendment and United States Supreme Court opinion interpreting it.
The State's only argument in that regard is the bare contention that the Eighth
Amendment principles do not apply to this case because it does not involve a death sentence or a
juvenile life sentence. That argument is directly contradicted by the applicable United States
Supreme Court precedent, which expressly derived the Eighth Amendment principles from noncapital cases and still applies them to non-capital cases. Instead, the State argues a series of
strawman arguments, trying to recast this case as an evaluation under the fourth prong of the test
for abuse of discretion. The State's arguments are improper, and are also inconsistent with the
applicable precedent as well as the facts in the record.
On the issues actually raised in this appeal, this Court should vacate Mr. Black's sentence
because it was reached inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, and thus, was an abuse of
the district court's discretion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Black's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not acting consistently with the applicable
legal standards, which are rooted in the Eighth Amendment, when it imposed Mr. Black's
sentence.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Acting Consistently With The Applicable Legal
Standards, Which Are Rooted In The Eighth Amendment, When It Imposed Mr. Black's
Sentence

A.

This Case Does Implicate The Eighth Amendment Because The District Court's Reached
Its Decision In A Manner Contrary To The Principles Embodied In That Amendment
The State's primary argument in this appeal is that the Eighth Amendment principles are

not applicable in this case because it does not involve the death penalty or a juvenile lifesentences. (E.g., Resp. Br., pp.12-13, 18, 22, 23.) It offers no analysis for drawing such an
arbitrary line under the Eighth Amendment. (See generally Resp. Br.) That is unsurprising, as
the State's position in that regard is actually contradicted by the Supreme Court's precedent.
Most notably, Atkins itself specifically drew the Eighth Amendment principles at issue
from decisions in non-capital cases - Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962), in
which the Court had applied those principles to a ninety-day sentence imposed for drug use; and

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), in which the Court had applied those principles to
twelve-year sentence for falsifying records. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). 1 The

Atkins Court also specifically relied on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin, in which
Justice Kennedy expressly noted that, while the Eighth Amendment's principles are most often
discussed in the death penalty context, they are, nevertheless, still applicable in non-capital
cases. Id. (citing Harm/in v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in

1

See also, e.g., United States v. Larson, 558 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Mont. 2008) (applying these
principles while imposing sentence for receipt and possession of child pornography), ajf'd in
part, vacated in part by United States v. Larson, 346 Fed.Appx. 166 (9th Cir. 2009).
3

part and concurring in judgment)2; see, e.g., United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir.
2008) (noting that Atkins applies to non-capital cases in its statement of the applicable
standards). As such, there is no basis in the applicable United States Supreme Court precedent
for the State's arbitrary distinction.

See, e.g., State v. Ryan, 396 P.3d 867, 877 (Or. 2017)

(expressly rejecting the argument that Atkins and its progeny are limited to the death penalty
context).
Since the district court did not act consistent with the applicable Eighth Amendment
principles when it imposed Mr. Black's sentence, the Eighth Amendment is implicated by this
case. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (reaffirming that the district
court will abuse its discretion, inter alia, when it acts inconsistent with the applicable legal
standards); State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113 (2018) (same).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Downplaying The Significance Of
Mr. Black's Intellectual Disability For Reasons That Are Not Permissible Under The
Applicable Legal Standards

1.

The district court's discussion of the "severity" of Mr. Black's disability
demonstrates it was refusing to consider the full mitigating impact of Mr. Black's
intellectual disability rather than just weighing his disability against other factors

The United States Supreme Court and Idaho's appellate courts have all recognized that,
even if the district court recites the applicable standards, it can still abuse its discretion if its
ensuing analysis is actually inconsistent with the recited standards. E.g., Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 283 (2004); State v. Van Komen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016); State v. Quintana, 155
Idaho 124, 129 (Ct. App. 2013). Nevertheless, the State contends that, because the district court

2

While Harmelin was a fractured opinion with little actually controlling precedent, the fact that
the majority in Atkins adopted the rationales Justice Kennedy's concurrence, means the
rationales in that concurrence now represent the controlling legal principles.
4

talked about the nature and extent of Mr. Black's intellectual disability and said it would
consider it in mitigation, the district court could not have abused its discretion in this case.
(Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) The State is mistaken because the content of the district court's analysis
reveals that, despite paying lip service to the applicable standards, its analysis proceeded along a
distinctly different, erroneous path. Compare Tennard, 542 U.S. at 283.
Specifically, though the district court spent a significant amount of time talking about
Mr. Black's intellectual disability, it was not to consider the impacts of that disability on his
culpability consistent with the explanations given by the two medical professionals who
evaluated Mr. Black. Instead, the district court's discussion of his intellectual disability was
centered on disagreement with the medical professionals' conclusions, as the district court
explained the impact of Mr. Black's intellectual disability was not as significant as it had been
diagnosed.
For example, the district court spent significant time explaining how Mr. Black's
intellectual disability was less severe than the intellectual disability at issue in Larson, and so,
had less mitigating impact than Mr. Larson's: "The reason I read this into the record is that
Larson really has nothing to do with this case because Mr. Black is a fully functioning adult male

and there's nothing that suggests that any intellectual disability has prevent him from functioning
as an adult in society." 3 (46802 (2/21/19) Tr., p.36, L.22 - p.37, L.1; see generally 46802
Tr. (2/21/19), p.36, L.3 - p.37, L.18, p.48, L.6 - p.49, L.3.) The State contends the district court's
comparison to Larson was permissible because both evaluators described Mr. Black's disability
3

In addition to being improper analysis under the applicable legal standards, the district court's
assertion in that regard was also contrary to the medical professionals' opinions. For example,
Dr. Jorgensen specifically found that Mr. Black has been unable to live as a fully functioning
adult in society: "Mr. Black has been unable to live independently due to limited adaptive
functioning skills" and he "has often struggled to obtain and maintain gainful employment"
because of his intellectual disability. (46802 Con£ Exhs., p.8 (emphasis added).)
5

as "mild," whereas Mr. Larson's disability was "severe." (Resp. Br., pp.17, 19.) That, however,
misunderstands the way in which the psychological evaluations use the terms "mild" and
"severe."
Until the adoption of the DSM-Vin 2013, 4 the term "mild" was ''used to describe people
with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70."' Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 719 (2014)
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3). In fact, it appears Dr. Jorgensen was actually using the
term "mild" in this manner, as his report says: "Mr. Black obtained a Full Scale IQ score of 67
(1st percentile), which places his abilities in the mild intellectual disability range." (46802 Con£
Exhs., p.8.)

As such, both Mr. Black and Mr. Larson would be described as "mildly"

intellectually disabled, as both their IQs were below 70. 5 See Larson, 558 F.Supp.2d 1111
(noting his IQ was 70). As such, basis for the State's attempt to justify the district court's
decision is contrary to the applicable facts and should be rejected.
4

Mr. Larson's diagnosis occurred before the adoption of the DSM-V. See Larson, 558
F.Supp.2d 1103 (issued in 2008).
5
The DSM-V has moved away from categorizations based on IQ scores and focuses instead on
the degree to which the person's adaptive functioning is impaired in various domains. See
Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of Prooffor Determining Intellectual Disability
in Capital Cases: How High is Too High?, 20 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 163, 190 (Spring 2015).
However, that does not mean that Mr. Larson would necessarily not still be described as having a
"mild" intellectual disability. His ability to function at the level of a nine-year-old might still be
classified as a "mild" when compared to a person with a disability (such as a non-verbal form of
autism) which would prevent him from engaging in even the basic level of functioning
Mr. Larson could. See Larson, 558 F.Supp.2d at 1104-05 (noting that Mr. Larson was able to
read and spell at a third-grade level and perform arithmetic at a second-grade level).
More importantly, though, any such comparison between Mr. Larson and any other
person with a more severe disability would not mean that the mitigating impact of Mr. Larson's
disability on his culpability for his actions would be lessened because of that comparison. In the
same way, the mitigating impact of Mr. Black's intellectual disability is not decreased because
his disability might be colloquially said to be less severe than Mr. Larson's. Cf Penry v.
Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 322-23 (1989) (explaining the problem with rejecting an
impulsivity diagnosis because the person acted "deliberately' as that term is commonly
understood"). Both men have intellectual disabilities which affect their behaviors in ways
dissimilar to a "normal" adult, and therefore, that is what must be given proper mitigating
impact. See Tennard, 542 U.S. at 286-87.
6

More importantly, the United States Supreme Court has held that, because of the
difference between a person with a disability and a person without a disability, all intellectual
disabilities are inherently mitigating.

Tennard, 542 U.S. at 286-87. Thus, it explained that

considering one person's intellectual disability as having less of a mitigating impact in their case
because their condition was less severe than another person's intellectual disability is improper.
See id. at 287 ("[T]o say that only those features and circumstances that a panel of federal

appellate judges deems to be 'severe' (let alone 'uniquely severe') could have such a tendency
[to be mitigating] is incorrect.") Certainly, the district court can weigh the mitigating impact of
an intellectual disability against the other aggravating factors in a particular case, but to do so
consistent with the applicable Eighth Amendment principles, it must actually give full
consideration to the mitigating impact of the intellectual disability. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry
I), 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (explaining that "it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to

present mitigating evidence to the sentence. The sentence must also be able to consider and give
effect to that evidence in imposing sentence."), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S.
305; see also Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (explaining the "give effect
to" language was "the key" to the decision in Penry I).
This is the point that the State's argument fails to appreciate. The district court in this
case made it clear that it considered Mr. Black's intellectual disability to have less mitigating
impact in his case based its comparative severity to Mr. Larson's.

(See, e.g., 46802

Tr. (2/21/19), p.49, Ls.1-3, p.50, Ls.5-10.) That is contrary to the Tennard Court's explanation
of how the Eighth Amendment principles work. As such, Mr. Black is not challenging the way
the district court weighed the mitigating effect it actually found against other factors, as the State
would prefer he had. (See Resp. Br., pp.17-18.) Rather, he is arguing that, by downplaying its

7

mitigating effect in the first place, the district court failed to give the necessary effect to the
mitigating impact before it even started weighing that factor against others. Since that failure
was, itself, contrary to the applicable legal standards, the district court abused its discretion when
it imposed Mr. Black's sentence.

2.

The district court's refusal to consider the mitigating impact of the impulsivity
diagnosis is contrary to the applicable United States Supreme Court precedent; the
State's reliance on a prior decision that was abrogated by those Supreme Court
decisions is not compelling

In responding to Mr. Black's assertion - that the district court impermissibly downplayed
the mitigating nature of his intellectual disability by not considering his impulsively - the State
relies on State v. Porter to argue that the district court has the ability to decide whether an
intellectual disability is mitigating or aggravating. (Resp. Br., p.21 (citing State v. Porter, 130
Idaho 772, 789 (1996)).) However, Porter has been abrogated on that precise point by the
United States Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Tennard and Atkins.
The Tennard Court stated, in no uncertain terms, that "impaired intellectual functioning is
inherently mitigating: '[T]oday our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically

less culpable than the average criminal."' Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at
316).) (emphasis added, other alterations from original). The term "inherent" means "established
as an essential part of something:
THESAURUS, 425 (2007).

INTRINSIC."

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND

The term "categorical" means "not modified or restricted :

ABSOLUTE, UNQUALIFIED." Id. at 116. As such, the Supreme Court's use of both those
terms makes it clear that an intellectual disability is, in fact, always mitigating - its mitigating
impact is unrestricted by the very nature of the condition itself

Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287;

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Therefore, the State's reliance on Porter is improper.

8

Moreover, Tennard explained that nothing in Atkins required the defendant to establish a
nexus between his intellectual disability and the criminal conduct before the Eighth Amendment
principles were triggered: "Equally, we cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence
is not relevant mitigating evidence-and thus that the Penry question need not even be askedunless the defendant also establishes a nexus to the crime." Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287 (referring
to Penry I). The "Penry question" addresses the same issue that exists in Mr. Black's case - the
need for proper evaluation of the mitigating nature of an intellectual disability. See Tennard, 542
U.S. at 278-79 (describing the nature of Tennard's claim under Penry I, 492 U.S. 302).
In fact, Penry I evaluated almost the same situation that existed in this case - how a
diagnosis that an intellectual disability causes the person to act impulsively should be considered
mitigating even though the criminal conduct included deliberate actions. See Penry I, 492 U.S.
at 322-23. Specifically, it explained that this sort of diagnosis has mitigating impact beyond any
effect on the specific criminal acts because the defendant could still be found to be less morally
culpable because his intellectual disability made him "less able than a normal adult to control his
impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his conduct" and so, he "was less morally culpable
than defendants who have no such excuse, but who acted 'deliberately' as that term is commonly
understood." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, the district court's refusal to consider Mr. Black's impulsivity diagnosis as
mitigating because it concluded his acts were "deliberate" as that term is commonly understood
(See 46802 Tr. (2/21/19), p.45, Ls.14-21), was an abuse of discretion regardless of how

reasonably the State feels the district court weighed the mitigators and aggravators it actually
found. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.22-23.) In fact, the Tennard Court expressly rejected a
Court of Appeals decision that echoed the State's analysis on this point because, it explained, the

9

lower court had evaluated the issue "under an improper legal standard." Id. at 287-88 (rejecting
a decision based on the lack of a connection between the impulsivity diagnosis and the alleged
criminal conduct).

This Court should find an abuse of discretion in this case for the same

reasons.

3.

The State has misunderstood how the Eighth Amendment principles apply to the
concepts of incapacitation, protection of society, and rehabilitation

Mr. Black contended that the district court abused its discretion by using "incapacitation"
as the overriding justification for his sentence because it demonstrated it was not giving effect to
the mitigating nature of his intellectual disability.

(App. Br., pp.20-22.)

The State has

misconstrued this argument as claiming the district court cannot consider protection of society
when imposing sentence.

(See Resp. Br., p.24.)

This Court should reject that strawman

argument.
The protection of society is, indeed, the primary goal of any sentencing decision. State v.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). However, the Supreme Court has explained that this

goal also "feather[s] together" with the other goals of sentencing. Id. Thus, for example, the
goal of protection of society can be furthered by imposing a sentence focused on rehabilitation,
as successful rehabilitative efforts would likely reduce the potential for recidivation in the long
term. Likewise, a sentence imposing a long indeterminate term in order to deter others would
also further the goal of protection of society. As such, the interplay between the goals needs to
be accounted for as well in a sentencing decision. See id.
That interplay is actually at the heart of the issue with using "incapacitation" as the sole
justification for a prison sentence. While "incapacitating" a person - simply removing them
from contact with society - would further the goal of protection of society in the short term, it

10

ignores the practical reality that most prisoners will ultimately be released, which means the
protection afforded by such a sentence imposed only for that reason would be fleeting. Since it
does not actually effectively promote the overarching goal of protection of society, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the applicable Eighth Amendment principles do not permit it
to be the sole overriding factor justifying a prison sentence. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 73 (2010).
This issue with the effectiveness of "incapacitation" extends beyond just the goal of
protection of society; it also impacts the goal of rehabilitation. It is, in fact, the reason both the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Congress have rejected the idea that a court
can extend a prison sentence solely in the hopes that it will give the person more time to access
treatment programs during that prison sentence.

See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319,

328-29 (2011) (addressing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(a)). While such a sentence would potentially
give the person access to more programming, there is no guarantee that it will occur because the
department of correction, not the sentencing court, ultimately controls inmates' access to
programs. See id. Since the sentencing court cannot guarantee access to the needed programs,
the use of an "incapacitation" rationale as the overriding justification for a prison sentence is
improper. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. In other words, the district court's express use of the
incapacitation rationale as the overriding justification to promote protection of society or
rehabilitation is improper in a case like Mr. Black's because it demonstrates the district court was
not giving effect to the inherently-mitigating effect of Mr. Black's intellectual disability. See
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 319 (indicating that the failure to give effect to mitigating information is

improper under the applicable Eighth Amendment principles).

11

The information in the record shows the district court did not act consistent with these
Eighth Amendment principles when imposing Mr. Black's sentence. Dr. Jorgensen was clear
that a long prison sentence without the appropriate rehabilitative programming would detract
from the protection to society in Mr. Black's case and Dr. Sombke was clear that the necessary
rehabilitative programming was not available in the prison system. (46802 Con£ Exhs., p.1 0;
45316 Conf. Exhs., p.7.) Thus, Mr. Black's argument in this regard is that the district court's
decision to impose a full fixed sentence based on the idea that it will remove him from society
(incapacitate him) and give him more time to access rehabilitative programs (46802
Tr. (2/21/19), p.62, Ls.11-13, p.63, Ls.18-22) - was an abuse of its discretion because it was not
consistent with the Eighth Amendment standards applicable to the analysis of that particular
issue. (App. Br., pp.20-22.)
The State wildly misconstrues Mr. Black's argument in this regard, attempting to recast it
as an argument that the district court cannot consider rehabilitation or protection of society as
part of the sentence at all. (Resp. Br., pp.23-24.) Mr. Black is arguing no such thing. He is
simply pointing out that the applicable Eighth Amendment principles impact on how the district
court considers these broad concepts, and that the district court in this case did not act
consistently with those principles. That would constitute an abuse of discretion regardless of
whether the district court also weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors that it did find in
an ostensibly-reasonable manner.
As such, this Court should reject the State's strawman arguments and, based on the actual
issues raised, vacate the sentence because it was imposed inconsistent with the applicable Eighth
Amendment principles.

12

C.

The Challenge To The District Court's Reliance On Improper Information Is Properly
Raised For The First Time On Appeal
In addition to the district court acting inconsistent with the applicable Eighth Amendment

principles, Mr. Black also pointed out that the district court failed to act consistent with the
applicable legal standards by relying on the PSI author's improper recommendation to impose
the "original sentence." (App. Br., pp.23-24.) The precedent is clear that a defendant may raise
challenges to the district court's sentencing rationales for the first time on appeal because that is
the first meaningful opportunity he has to challenge them. State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 79091 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he defendant has not been required to object to the sentence pronounced
immediately after its pronouncement in order to challenge on appeal the appropriateness of the
sentence. . . . [T]he only point of sentencing proceedings is to contest-absent express
agreement-the sentence to be imposed. Thus, no further objection or request is necessary.");
cf In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 758 (2014) ("Once the court ruled, ... Guardians

did not have to file a motion for reconsideration in order to preserve the issue [a claim for
attorney's fees following a sua sponte denial of fees entered by the court] for appeal.")
In fact, there is no procedure except the direct appeal by which the district court's
sentencing rationales may be directly reviewed. The only potential opportunity for an evaluation
of those rationales would be through a motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35(b). However, the
Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that evaluations of such motions do not function as an
"appeal" of the initial sentencing decision. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) Rather,
Rule 35 only allows the district court to reweigh the mitigating and aggravating factors in light of
some new or additional information that it did not have at the initial sentencing hearing. Id.
Since I.C.R. 35(b) will not allow the defendant an opportunity to simply ask for review of the

13

rationales the district court used in the initial sentencing analysis, Mr. Black's only option is to
argue them as error on appeal. See Clontz, 156 Idaho at 791.
To avoid the result of the district court's clear reliance on improper information, the State
raises another strawman argument, trying to twist Mr. Black's argument into a challenge to the
PSI itself, which, as the State points out, cannot be made for the first time on appeal. (See

Resp. Br., p.27.) The State ignores the fact that Mr. Black actually specifically disavowed such
an argument in his opening brief (See App. Br., p.23 n.10.) The issue on appeal is not that,
because of the PSI author's error, Mr. Black should be resentenced with a corrected PSI. Rather,
it is that district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal principles when it
imposed Mr. Black's sentence, as demonstrated by the fact that it relied on clearly-improper
information which happened to be contained in the PSI. Cf State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 596
(2011) (indicating that it is the district court's reliance on such improper recommendations that
justifies vacating the sentence, not the error in the PSI itself). As such, this Court should vacate
the sentence because of that abuse of discretion as well.

D.

The District Court's Belief That It Would Be Nonsensical To Impose A Sentence With
An Indeterminate Portion Was Not Rational
Mr. Black pointed out that the district court's belief - that a sentence with an

indeterminate portion was meaningless because he had no ties to Idaho - was not rational in light
of the information in the record. (App. Br., pp.24-26.) While it is true that the district court did
not specifically mention the detainer from Oregon in commenting that an indeterminate sentence
would be nonsensical, that does not invalidate Mr. Black's arguments in this regard. The fact
that Mr. Black had a pending Oregon detainer was one of the reasons an indeterminate sentence,
why the possibility of parole, would be sensical - it would potentially allow Mr. Black to more
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quickly resolve that issue and begin reintegrating back into society. More generally, though, the
district court's belief that it would be meaningless to impose a sentence with an indeterminate
portion represented a misunderstanding of the scope of its discretion, one which had the practical
effect of usurping the Parole Board's ability to even consider Mr. Black for that possibility.
Again, the State raises a strawman in an attempt to misconstrue Mr. Black's argument as
limiting the district court's sentencing discretion to only a wholly-indeterminate term. (Resp.
Br., p.31.) That, however, is not the case. This issue could have been properly addressed by a
sentence such as the one recommended by the prosecutor below - a five-year sentence with four
years fixed. (See 46802 Tr. (2/21/19), p.7, Ls.18-20.) Regardless, the district court's refusal to
consider the possibility of parole for an irrational reason also shows the abuse of discretion in
imposing Mr. Black's sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Black respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or,
alternatively, remand this case for another new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 13 th day of February, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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